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ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

SHAPING MINDS, SAVING SOULS

Azmil Tayeb



Islamic Education in Indonesia and Malaysia

Despite their close geographic and cultural ties, Indonesia and Malaysia have dramatically different Islamic education, with that in Indonesia being relatively decentralized and discursively diverse, while that in Malaysia is centralized and discursively restricted.

The book explores the nature of the Islamic education systems in Indonesia and Malaysia and the different approaches taken by these states in managing these systems. The book argues that the post-colonial state in Malaysia has been more successful in centralizing its control over Islamic education, and more concerned with promoting a restrictive orthodoxy, compared to the post-colonial state in Indonesia. This is due to three factors: the ideological makeup of the state institutions that oversee Islamic education; patterns of societal Islamization that have prompted different responses from the states; and control of resources by the central government that influences centre-periphery relations. Informed by the theoretical works of state-in-society relations and historical institutionalism, this book shows that the three aforementioned factors can help a state to minimize influence from the society and exert its dominance, in this case by centralizing control over Islamic education. Specifically, they help us understand the markedly different landscapes of Islamic education in Malaysia and Indonesia.

It will be of interest to academics in the field of Southeast Asian Studies, Asian Education and Comparative Education.

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Dedicated to the loving memory of Zaza, whose beautiful, kind soul had left us far too soon. We miss you every single day. May you rest in peace.

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1 Functionalization of Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia

Introduction

There I was sitting among the *ustadzs* (male religious teachers) in the teachers' lounge of a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Indonesia's South Kalimantan province, drenched in sweat from the sweltering mid-morning Borneo heat while being plied with an endless supply of piping hot sweet tea and *lumpia* (fried spring rolls), when the moment of research epiphany struck. The television was showing an ever-popular infotainment program when suddenly a story came on about an inter-religious celebrity couple and their recent controversial marriage. The news caught the *ustadzs*' attention and they started to discuss and debate it from wide-ranging theological points of views. As a Malaysian it was quite a scene to behold. In my personal experience, such an "unorthodox" marriage would provoke near universal condemnation from the general Malay-Muslim community, let alone in the deeply conservative environment of an Islamic school. The spirited debates in the teachers' lounge naturally brought questions to my mind: What kind of Islamic education system has allowed for such a discourse to arise? Why are Indonesia and Malaysia so different?

These questions eventually led me to investigate how and why Muslim-majority states use or functionalize Islamic education to further enhance their legitimacy. Through the analyses of the Islamic education systems in Indonesia and Malaysia, I illustrate the varied ways through which states in the two countries have tried to use those systems to promote hegemony. I show that the combined influence of ideological hegemony of state Islamic orthodoxy and a strong centralizing tendency on the part of the state explain the severely restricted discursive space of Islamic education in Malaysia. On the other hand, the broad autonomy enjoyed by Islamic schools and the strong presence of heterogenous values in the state Islamic orthodoxy explain the relatively open discursive nature of Islamic education in Indonesia.

Differences between Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia

There are three key differences between Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia that can shed light on the aforementioned puzzle. First, Islamic schools

in Indonesia greatly outnumber those in Malaysia, even after taking into account the size of the Muslim population. At the latest count, there are 47,221 formal Islamic primary and secondary schools in Indonesia spread out over the vast archipelago (roughly one school for every 4,387 Muslims).[1] In comparison, there are 1,804 Islamic schools within the national education system in Malaysia (roughly one school for every 9,616 Muslims) and they are overwhelmingly concentrated in peninsular Malaysia.[2] In Indonesia, the sheer number of Islamic schools, the country's disparate geography, with its attendant cultural diversity, and inadequate budgets pose logistical and financial challenges to the relevant ministries in Jakarta when trying to implement a coherent Islamic education curriculum and enforce compliance from local educational offices and schools.[3] In contrast, the smaller number of schools coupled with the larger budget of ministries in charge of Islamic education allow the state to strengthen its hold over even supposedly autonomous Islamic schools in Malaysia.[4]

Second, most Islamic schools in Indonesia are privately owned and managed, while in Malaysia, the majority of Islamic schools are either under the management of the Ministry of Education or the State Islamic Councils (*Majlis Agama Islam Negeri*).[5] Private status provides Islamic schools in Indonesia room to operate autonomously, since they are not completely dependent on the Ministry of Religious Affairs for funding. But as we will soon see in subsequent chapters, this operational autonomy comes with the stiff price of not having enough resources to properly manage the schools. The public status of Islamic schools in Malaysia, on the other hand, means that they can be effectively managed by a central authority,

1 *Buku Saku Statistik Pendidikan Islam Tahun 2013/2014*, Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. http://pendis.kemenag.go.id/ebook/saku20132014/ (accessed on 15 October 2015); *Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010*, Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, p. 130.

2 Data KAFA, Sekolah Agama dan Masjid (Putrajaya: Bahagian Kemajuan Islam, Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, 2013), p. 30; Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report 2010, Department of Statistics Malaysia: www.statistics.gov.my/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=117&bul_id=MDMxdHZjWTk1SjFzTzNkRXYzcVZjdz09&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlhUUT09 (accessed on 12 October 2015).

3 The 2015 budgets for Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Religious Affairs are Rp88,3 triliun (US$6.5 billion) and Rp56,4 triliun (US$4.16 billion), respectively. Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara Tahun 2015, Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia: www.kemenkeu.go.id/wide/apbn2015 (accessed on 12 October 2015). The Ministry of Religious Affairs announced in 2015 that it is allocating Rp24 triliun (US$1.78 billion) to improve the quality of madrasah education in the next five years. "Kemenag Siap Tingkat Mutu Madrasah", Sinar Harapan, 13 August 2015 (accessed on 15 October 2015).

4 JAKIM's overall budget for 2015 is RM783,256,900 (US$188.8 million), a big part of which is used to fund an elementary Islamic education program called Kelas Al-Quran dan Fardhu Ain (KAFA). Meanwhile, Malaysian Ministry of Education's budget for 2015 is RM40,848,327,200 (US$9.85 billion). Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan 2015, Kementerian Kewangan Malaysia, pp. 118, 636. www.treasury.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4298:anggaran-perbelanjaan-persekutuan-2015&catid=447&Itemid=2473&lang=ms (accessed on 12 October 2015).

5 95 per cent of madrasah in Indonesia are private. Madrasah @ Indonesia (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian Agama RI, 2015), p. 14.

be it the Ministry of Education or the State Islamic Councils, especially when it comes to curriculum content, teachers' certification and appointment, choice of textbooks, examinations, and the like. In short, a streamlined standard can be established for Islamic education, either under the aegis of the ministry or the state religious authorities, with the trend leaning toward increasing centralization by the ministry. We will explore these differences in Chapters 3 and 4.

Third, there is a higher degree of institutional coherency in Malaysia than Indonesia when it comes to educational operations and objectives. Despite the constitution guaranteeing the sultans and by extension, the *Majlis Agama Islam Negeri*, wide latitude in managing Islamic affairs, including Islamic schools, within their jurisdiction, the reality is that Islamic education in Malaysia is overwhelmingly dominated by the federal government in Putrajaya. Despite occasional political differences, state institutions along the horizontal (Ministry of Education and JAKIM) and vertical (*Majlis Agama Islam Negeri*) axes of governance typically work in concert with each other especially in regard to curriculum content, school supervision, teachers' training and placement, and a host of other operational issues. In contrast, in Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture have been historically at odds with each other when it comes to the overall nature and future direction of Islamic education in Indonesia, especially with regard to the issue of "single-roof education" (*pendidikan satu atap*). The 1999 decentralization laws further exacerbated the rift between these two institutions. The role played by the Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI) and their local offices, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, further complicates the picture. Suffice it to say that lack of institutional coherency within and between the state institutions that oversee Islamic schools in Indonesia means that it is much harder for the state to imprint its ideological stamp on the Islamic education system as a whole. In Malaysia, by contrast, the state has been relatively unified and effective in shaping Islamic education.

Why functionalization and centralization of Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia?

Two main questions drive this book. The first question is comprised of three parts: to what extent and under what circumstances do the states in Indonesia and Malaysia functionalize Islamic education for their own political ends? How do they engage in such functionalization?[6] To what extent have such efforts been

6 Functionalization here refers to the state using Islamic education as an instrument to propagate and enforce a set of ideology on the society as a means to preserve its legitimacy and perpetuate its hold on power. Islamic education can be functionalized through centralized control of Islamic schools, curriculum, teachers' training, textbook content and selection, and teachers' appointments, among others. This book, therefore, strives to explain why the states in Indonesia and Malaysia adopt different approaches when it comes to functionalizing the Islamic education in their respective countries.

successful? A state shapes and controls Islamic education, I will argue in this book, when Islam, in its socio-political iterations, constitutes a potential basis for or threat to state legitimacy. States are likely to functionalize Islamic education when Islam assumes a saliency as a potentially potent organizational and oppositional socio-political force, which the state also has the opportunity to exploit. If outright repression alone is not enough to quell Islamic-based opposition to the state's legitimacy, winning hearts and minds through ideological co-optation can become an important state imperative. The state attempts to gain control of Islamic education through centralizing efforts such as insisting upon standardized curriculum and textbooks, centralized teachers' training, certification and placement, national examinations, appointment of school principals, and so on. Typically, the state also colludes with the religious authorities to establish a set of orthodox values to be instilled through the Islamic education curriculum that, I will argue, buttresses its legitimacy while stamping out competing religious interpretations.

The second research question is: Why has the state in Malaysia been more successful in exerting centralized control over Islamic education than the state in Indonesia? This book argues that the ability of the state in Malaysia to consolidate its control over Islamic education has been due to the state's ability to minimize the influence and centrifugal pull of the Muslim society at large. In particular, the state in Malaysia has been able to gain control over Islamic schools and Islamic education curriculum with minimal pushback from opposing Islamic groups. In contrast, the state in Indonesia has not been able to centralize control over Islamic education even during the highly centralizing period of the New Order regime (1966–1998). There are three factors that determine the state's resiliency and adaptability in interacting with Muslim society in pursuit of its Islamic education prerogatives: (i) the ideological makeup of the state institutions; (ii) patterns of Islamization in the society that necessitate different reactions from the state; and (iii) the control of resources by the central government that influences the interaction between the centre and its periphery.

Let us briefly consider each of these issues in turn. First, less intra-institutional resistance such as disagreements among departments or intransigent staff allows a state institution possessing a clear ideology to be more coherent when organizing Islamic education. Similar dynamics are also applicable to inter-institutional relations between state institutions that are part of the Islamic education system. In Malaysia, there is a high degree of ideological conformity within and between state institutions that manage Islamic education, even at the local level where long-standing traditions and cultural particularities remain pervasive and influential. The case studies of Islamic education in Kelantan and Sarawak in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively best exemplify what I term a "federalized" institutional mindset: local educational agents of the state believe the only way to improve the overall condition of Islamic education locally is through the heavy involvement of the federal government in Putrajaya. In Indonesia, in contrast, the ideological makeup of the institutions that oversee Islamic education is more fragmented and they are regularly at odds with each other. This institutional and ideological incoherency in turn hampers the efforts of the state in

Indonesia to assert more control over the Islamic education system in the country. Case studies of Aceh and Nusa Tenggara Timur in Chapters 3 and 4 best illustrate this shortcoming, as do the discussions of the single-roof education system and funding for Islamic education in Chapter 2.

The second factor is patterns of social Islamization. The wave of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s hit Indonesia and Malaysia in markedly different ways. The heightened fervour of political Islam that reverberated across the Muslim world at this time did not take on a similar urgency in Indonesia. Suharto's New Order regime did not have to contend with galvanized domestic Islamic sociopolitical forces that could pose a serious threat to its rule. On the contrary, a decade later the regime decided to exploit Islam as a counterweight against the rising challenge of a nationalist faction within the military.[7] While the regime did embark on Islam-oriented projects such as building more mosques and Islamic schools, promoting the MUI and establishing the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals or ICMI, its legitimacy did not depend on being publicly perceived as Islamic, which therefore allowed it to engage less with political Islam without significant political repercussions.[8] Meanwhile in Malaysia, the Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s sparked the growth of a stridently vocal Islamic civil society movement that challenged the legitimacy of the hitherto secular state from an Islamic perspective. Instead of crushing the Islamic opposition and remaining secular, Mahathir Mohamad's regime decided to Islamize the state, co-opt Islamic civil society and actively engage in the religiously charged public sphere, so as to burnish the state's Islamic credibility to rule.[9] In contrast to MUI in Indonesia, which is semi-official and has a narrowly prescribed scope of authority, JAKIM in Malaysia was from the early 1980s until the present day officially entrusted as the main driver of the state's Islamization efforts, replete with significant powers in matters pertaining to Islam. In short, Islamization dynamics in Malaysia posed a credible threat to the state's legitimacy, thus eliciting a reaction from the state to shape the Islamic public discourse in its favour, including by tightening its reins on the hitherto

7 For more details of the New Order regime's flirtation with Islam during this period, see William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation", Journal of Asian Studies 55.3 (August 1996): pp. 613–634; Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara Dalam Politik Orde Baru (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 318–352; Robert Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 83–89; Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), pp. 149–182.

8 Robert Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class", Indonesia 56 (October 1993), pp. 1–36.

9 For studies on the Islamic resurgence phenomenon in Malaysia, see Judith Nagata, Reflowering of Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and Their Roots (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984); Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among the Students (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1987); Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Fajar Bakti, 1987).

decentralized Islamic education system. No such threat arose in Indonesia, so that the impetus to refashion Islamic discourse was commensurately less.

The capacity to disburse resources to financially struggling Islamic schools is the third factor that contributes to the state's ability to limit the pressure and influence from the Muslim social actors and at the same time increase its control over the Islamic education system. As shown in the previous section, state institutions in charge of Islamic education in Malaysia such as the Ministry of Education and JAKIM have been well endowed with resources, in comparison to their counterparts in Indonesia. Resource superiority allows the central government in Malaysia to overcome the federal system that theoretically provides Islamic schools with some measure of autonomy (Article 3 of the constitution).[10] In contrast, the 1999 decentralization laws in Indonesia further complicate the efforts of the central government in Jakarta to distribute more resources to the Islamic schools, and hence have weakened its position vis-à-vis the Islamic education system. The issue of resource distribution within the federal/decentralized dimension of Islamic education system in Indonesia and Malaysia will be discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4. In short, the control and distribution of resources affect the dynamics of centre-periphery relations, which, in turn, determines the degree of control the state has over Islamic education in the country.

Chapter organization

The remainder of this chapter contains three main sections. *The first section* engages with a theoretical discussion on why and how states want to control national education systems, particularly Islamic education systems. This section sketches out the importance of ideological hegemony to regime maintenance, whereby moulding the education system into a certain ideological shape serves as one of the means to achieve that end. We contrast states' normative ideas about what they hope to achieve vis-à-vis ideological hegemony with the everyday practice, which occur when a state imposes its values on a society, in this case through a national education system. This discussion leads to an exposition of Joel Migdal's "state-in-society" approach.[11] Delving into the specific focus of this book, the section proceeds to describe the "functionalization" of Islamic education by some Muslim-majority states to serve specific political objectives and how these efforts did not always produce the desired results. Finally, this section explores the relationship between Islamic orthodoxy and the state, namely in the specific orthodox values found in the curriculum. *The second section* discusses how and why state institutions might form their own identities

10 For more details on centre-periphery financial relations in Malaysia, see B.H. Shafruddin, The Federal Factor in the Government and Politics of Peninsular Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 48–99.

11 Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform Each Other and Constitute One Another (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

and objectives that result in the general structure of a state being incoherent and fragmented. Here, literature on historical institutionalism is used to shed light on the formation and durability of institutional identity and how institutional identity helps or hinders attempts by states to achieve ideological hegemony. *The third section* discusses how the theories of state, institutionalism and orthodoxy fit with the argument of the book. I explain why the state in Malaysia has been more successful in centralizing its control over Islamic education than the state in Indonesia.

State ideological hegemony and national education

Ibn Khaldun, the renowned fourteenth-century Muslim sociologist, states that "both the pen and the sword are the instruments of the ruler to use in his affairs" to stress the equal importance of physical and ideological coercions in maintaining ruling power and legitimacy.[12] According to Michel Foucault, the productive aspect of state power cannot be expressed solely in the context of repression, or what he calls the "juridical conception" of state power. The power of the state traverses through the society, in which it "induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces discourse".[13] In other words, a state can only maintain its legitimacy and impose its ideological hegemony through a dialectical relationship with the society. Antonio Gramsci describes the construction of ideological hegemony within the society as

> [t]he phase in which previously germinated ideologies become 'party', come into confrontation and conflict, until one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself over the whole social area, – bringing about not only the unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.[14]

Cultural theorist, Raymond Williams, defines hegemony as

> [a] set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality

12 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: Volume 2, translated by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 46.

13 Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977 by Michel Foucault (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 119.

14 David Forgacs, ed., The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935 (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p. 205.

> beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.[15]

In such conceptions, the ideology of the state has to be perceived as natural in order for state legitimacy to be durable. To this end, the state needs to form what Antonio Gramsci calls "historically organic ideology", where such ideologies have "a validity that is 'psychological'; they 'organize' human masses, they form the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc".[16] In other words, the state's ideology has to be perceived as an integral part of the natural order of life. Therefore, it is imperative for the state to establish "non-repressive" components that are able to socialize the population in its values, generate support through indoctrination and serve as a complement to the blunt repressive arms of the state such as the army, police, judiciary and so on.[17] Louis Althusser terms the non-repressive components of the state as the "ideological state apparatuses", of which the schools, media, civil society, to name but a few, are part. The main function of the ideological state apparatus is to reproduce the dominant values in the society, which Althusser argues are those which legitimate capitalist relations of exploitation.[18] However, domination typically also involves concession. Gramsci posits that

> [h]egemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words – that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind.[19]

In short, a state cannot expect to be strong and resilient if it relies only on brute force and stands aloof from society. The state has to become part of the society and instil its values through the aforementioned ideological apparatuses. Among other things, this logic has given rise to the introduction of mandatory mass education over the last 150 years.

The rapid expansion of mass education began in the late nineteenth century as many states around the world started to modernize and implement systematic ways to manage and discipline their populations. The well-being of the nation

15 Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory", New Left Review I/82 (November–December 1973), p. 9.

16 Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, p. 199.

17 Gramsci states that "the 'normal' exercise of hegemony in what became the classic terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent variously balancing one another, without force exceeding consent too much". Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, p. 261. Max Weber observes that "physical force is often the last resort and that every system of legitimate domination attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy". Quoted in Jacques Berlinerblau, "Toward a Sociology of Heresy", History of Religions 40.4 (May 2001), p. 339.

18 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays (London: NLB, 1971), pp. 145–149.

19 Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, p. 211.

and its security depended on the control over the minds and bodies of the populace both as a source of legitimacy and as a human resource for the country's economic needs.[20] Mass education served as a means to mould and classify the population from a young age. For example, compulsory schooling for elementary-aged children became mandatory in England in 1880 and France in 1883.[21] Methods of disciplining and classifying students included, among others, creation of uniform timetables and curricula, imposition of mandatory exams and other evaluative measures, and class placement according to test results. Scientific management of national education became part of the state's repertoire to make governance and inculcation of state ideology more efficacious and orderly: "The government, particularly the administrative apparatus, needed knowledge that was concrete, specific and measurable in order to operate effectively".[22] Theoretically, schools serve as institutions of acculturation of young impressionable members of the population by reproducing the dominant cultural and economic norms within the society established by the state ideological hegemony.[23] Standardized curriculum, meanwhile, functions as a means to form a "large-group consciousness" that engenders a homogeneous student body, and subsequently, population. The Third Republic in late 1800s France, for instance, dealt with the socially and culturally fragmented French society at the time by implanting and increasing a sense of unity, patriotism and order under the overarching idea of French nationhood in the elementary school curriculum.[24] In this perspective, homogeneity of worldviews and social behaviours would lead to social stability, which, in turn, reduces the transaction costs of governance.[25] In short, leading officials of the European states began to see a political utility in the expansion and management of mass education to legitimize their rule as they modernized and as the state organs became intertwined with the capitalist economy in the late nineteenth century.[26] Thus the stage was set for national

20 Stephen Ball, Foucault, Power, and Education (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), p. 43.

21 Ibid., p. 42; Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 309.

22 Hubert Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 137. Quoted in ibid., p. 53.

23 A contention also made by Pierre Bourdieu, "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction" in Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey, eds., Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Basil Berstein, Class, Codes and Control, Volume 3: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 54–75; Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "Capitalism and Education in the United States" in Michael Young and Geoff Whitty, eds., Society, State and Schooling: Readings on the Possibilities for Radical Education (Surrey: The Falmer Press, 1977).

24 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 331–338.

25 Michael Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 61–81.

26 Foucault contends that similar "production of truth" process is also applicable, albeit with certain modifications, to socialist countries. Gordon, Power/Knowledge, p. 133.

education to become an indispensable part of state-making and nation-building projects throughout the world.

The everyday reality of ideological hegemony in mass education

In practice, however, states' attempts to achieve ideological hegemony through mass education are rarely monolithic. Local state actors such as officers from the local educational offices, school principals and teachers mediate and re-interpret directives and policy prescriptions from apex state officials, according to their own particular experiences and preferences. Ioan Davies notes that:

> The extent to which education is able to counter the political elite's policies will depend in part on its own economic independence, in part on patterns of socialization which are strong enough to resist the norms of the system, and in part on the persistence of centres of local political power which are able to back alternative schemes.[27]

One factor that has the potential to subvert the state's ideological hegemony in the classrooms is the idea of the "hidden curriculum". Michael Apple defines the hidden curriculum as "norms and values that are implicitly, but effectively, taught in schools and that are not usually talked about in teachers' statements of end or goals".[28] In this interpretation, classroom interactions – learning and teaching – can contain unstated yet deeply rooted and unquestioned assumptions that form the perimeter of what one can or cannot discuss in class (a dominant hidden curriculum). They can also nurture "subversive" teaching and learning practices that challenge the dominant assumptions. An example of the dual-sided dynamics of the hidden curriculum can be clearly seen in some "pro-opposition" Islamic schools in Malaysia. Teachers strive to offer their superior version of "truth" in the classrooms and in so doing distinguish the school's ideology from that of the ministry, but this "truth" is dialectically developed within the limiting confines of the conservative ideals embodied in and underpinning the state's own educational visions.[29]

Proponents of the cultural and economic reproductive role of mass education mentioned earlier, such as Michael Apple, Pierre Bourdieu, Basil Berstein and others also claim that hidden curriculum functions as a subtle way to further embed dominant cultural and economic values, which in this context refers to those related to the capitalist mode of production, in classroom learning.[30] The

27 Ioan Davies, "The Management of Knowledge: A Critique of the Use of Typologies in the Sociology of Education" in Michael Young, ed., Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971), p. 275.

28 Apple, Ideology and Curriculum, p. 84.

29 Interview with the principal of SABK al-Fitrah, Tanah Merah, Kelantan, 31 July 2013.

30 Henry Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983), pp. 48–50.

state institution in charge of national education and its local agents, in short, tolerates differences of ideas in the classroom as long as the disagreements are delimited within this invisible discursive boundary. To illustrate, in the Malaysian Islamic education system, heavily dominated by state orthodox values (discussed later in this chapter), "deviant" Islamic beliefs such Shia and Ahmadiyah are discussed in the classroom, but only within the immutable context that these beliefs are completely wrong and that only the dominant version of Sunni Islam is acceptable. It is this immutable context that forms the invisible discursive boundary allowed by the dominant hidden curriculum.

On the flip side, teachers and students can also use the hidden curriculum as a counter-hegemonic means to defy the dominant narrative of the state as embodied in the national curriculum. Social actors such as students and teachers are not simply passive automatons but endowed with personal agency shaped by the particular values of their local community, group identity or the school itself.[31] For example, despite official attempts to instil values such as punctuality, conformity and obedience, some students purposely show up late to class, goof off and make fun of their teachers while at the same time satisfying the school's minimum requirements. Such students are carrying out acts similar to what James Scott terms "everyday forms of resistance".[32] In most cases, state hegemony as projected through the dominance of national curriculum – hidden or otherwise – is simply too powerful for teachers and students to confront in a more forceful or direct manner. As such, the employment of a hidden curriculum by teachers and students as an act of resistance typically serves as an empowering tool on an individual or small-group scale but is rarely enough to inflict serious lasting damage on the overall system. In the case of Malaysia, the hidden curricula of the state and the schools generally revolve around similar conservative Islamic ideals, even for schools that are known to be pro-opposition. Therefore, pro-opposition schools can claim moral victory by possessing the "higher" truth than the state but in a practical sense these schools still remain under the firm control of the state due to their precarious financial situation, as we shall see in Chapter 3. Even Islamic schools that are somewhat financially autonomous from the state also find it more acceptable to frame their political opposition via the conservative ideals promoted by the state Islamic orthodoxy as evidenced by the case of integrated Islamic schools in Chapter 5. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the use of hidden curriculum as a means of resistance in the classroom is moot due to the multifaceted Islamic values propagated by the state, which allow schools to openly teach and practice their own religious ideals, be they progressive or conservative. Examples of ideological openness allowed by the state in Indonesia are amply illustrated by the pluralist

31 Michael Apple, Education and Power (Boston, London, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 91–134; Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education, pp. 107–111.

32 Scott gives the examples of peasant resistance to everyday forms of injustice and repression in rural Malaysia in acts such as sabotage, boycott, theft, and others. James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 248–273.

Islamic school in Nusa Tenggara Timur in Chapter 4 and the deeply conservative integrated Islamic school in Depok in Chapter 5.

A state's projection of hegemony onto the national education system is not always coherent and totalizing. Instead of looking at a state exercising its power as an autonomous entity, existing above and outside the social realm with its own prerogatives,[33] a state should be studied through its dialectical relationship with the society. In analysing the function of power within the state–society relations, Foucault avers that:

> Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application.[34]

In the context of state hegemony in national education, ideological dissemination simply does not flow unilaterally from the state to the society. As Eugen Weber illustrates in his densely detailed and vivid study of French society in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Third Republic's ideological project to instil a strong sense of French nationhood among the socially and culturally divided population through the national education system only became successful when the majority of French people began to see the utility of attaining education beyond the rudimentary level, in order to pursue job opportunities in the expanding national economy, bureaucracy and the military, and to increase their social prestige by being educated. Also crucial was the state's heavy investment in improving public infrastructure such as roads and school buildings and making education free, all of which made attending school a more accessible and pleasant experience for many rural children.[35]

The state and the society, according to Joel Migdal, constitute each other as their components interact with each other at various levels of governance. Migdal treats the state as just another social organization, which is to say that the state is not immune to contestations between various social groups. He then posits a new definition of the state, which expands on the traditional notion coined by Max Weber. Migdal argues that the state is "a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) *the image of a coherent, con-*

33 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

34 Gordon, Power/Knowledge, p. 98.

35 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 303–338.

trolling organization in a territory, and (2) *the actual practices of its multiple parts*" (emphasis in original).[36] The significant feature of this definition is the distinction between the state's image and its actual practices. The image of the state is one of coherency and the projection of a unitary whole; in practice, however, the state consists of multiple parts that might not work in harmony and might even act in contradiction to the overall goals set by the state's apex leaders. The multiple parts of the state can be influenced by various social forces, political interest groups, religious organizations and others, situating them in the midst of a tug-of-war between the normative aims of the "unitary" state and the actual demands of the society. In the context of projecting ideological hegemony via mass education, the ideology of the state is first shaped at the top by the apex officials' interaction with social forces at the centre of power. A good example is when top state officials formulate policies based on electoral calculations in order to further entrench their political incumbency, as we shall see in Chapter 2, which explains how Malaysian policymakers flip-flopped over the policy to teach Science and Mathematics in English. As the ideology wends its way to the periphery through various levels of governance, it is further reshaped by the state's local agents and local social forces that might be influenced by unique local cultures and political dynamics or even by an individual school's long-standing traditions. Therefore, the analytical lens must be trained on the process in which state ideology is shaped and contested through dialectical interactions between components of the state and the society, rather than merely focusing on the endpoints (state and society as two separate mutually exclusive wholes).

According to Migdal, there are four levels of governance where contestation of state authority can take place.[37] First are the *trenches*, i.e. the lowest rung of the institutional bureaucracy; second are the *dispersed field offices* (one step above the trenches), staffed by "implementors" or essentially mid-level bureaucrats; third are the institution's *central offices*, most likely in the capital and staffed by upper-level bureaucrats; and finally the *commanding heights*, which is where the image of the state is crafted and projected for public consumption. The interactions within and between these four levels of state organization in conjunction with their engagement with various social forces present what Migdal calls "pressure points": arenas of domination and opposition in state–society relations that in the end shape the capacity of the state to effectively assert its ideological hegemony.[38] In regards to mass education, the so-called "trenches" are the local schools; "dispersed field offices" are the local educational offices; "central offices" are the high-ranking officials at the Ministry in charge of formulating the educational policies; and last "the commanding heights", consist of top national politicians who see the political utility of mass education and wish to instrumentalize it. In regard to the argument of the book,

36 Migdal, State in Society, pp. 15–16.
37 Ibid., pp. 117–124.
38 Ibid., pp. 126–134.



Figure 1.1 Joel Migdal's "pressure points" in the national education system.

the pressure points chart the flow of the state's hegemonic control of Islamic education, starting from the formulation of values that are part of the Islamic education curriculum at the apex (commanding heights and central offices) to the implementation and enforcement of the curriculum at the local level by central offices and dispersed field offices, and finally to schools' compliance in the trenches. I will argue throughout this book that, compared to Indonesia, the state in Malaysia at the apex (the national politicians, the Ministry of Education and JAKIM) has been more successful in exerting its ideological dominance on the local levels as represented by the local educational offices and schools by exacting near total compliance with state Islamic orthodox values (to be explained in detail later in this chapter). In Indonesia, by contrast, the state Islamic orthodoxy is characterized by diversity of values, which result in local educational offices and schools having a broad autonomy in practising their own Islamic ideals.

Overview of the post-colonial states in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1950–present

Since the end of World War II, the nature of the post-colonial state in Indonesia has undergone more changes than the post-colonial state in Malaysia. The post-colonial state in Indonesia can be divided into four eras: the brief flirtation with the federal system in the first half of 1950s; the Guided Democracy period (1959–1966); the New Order period (1966–1998); and the Reformasi period (1998–present). The first government formed in 1950 was federal in nature, as a way to unite various disparate and politically autonomous regions under a single form of governance. Weak cabinets, intense political rivalry

between various mass organizations and the then President Sukarno's proclivity for a unitary state undermined the federal system, which resulted in rebellions on the Outer Islands, namely in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi. The federal system finally broke down in 1959 when Sukarno declared Indonesia to be a "Guided Democracy" and consolidated power in the hands of the President.[39] The centralizing tendency of the state became more intense during the era of the New Order regime as the state expanded its reach over every aspect of Indonesia's social, political, and economic life.[40] After the fall of Suharto and the New Order regime in 1998, the Indonesian state underwent a massive decentralization process that transferred control over matters such as education and economic activities to the local level.[41] The state in Indonesia, even at the height of its centralizing drive during the New Order period, has never been able or simply unwilling to assume control over the predominantly private and autonomous Islamic schools and shape the Islamic education curriculum into a regime legitimizing one; in other words, functionalization of Islamic education. The state throughout the Indonesian post-independence period, regardless of its nature, simply does not rely on being perceived as Islamic in order to be legitimate.

Meanwhile, the post-colonial state in Malaysia has been from its inception in 1957 a federal one. Despite being federal in nature, the state in Malaysia has always been highly centralized and unitary, with the political and economic power overwhelmingly concentrated in Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya.[42] Moreover, the state in Malaysia has always been under the control of the UMNO-led federal government since independence, which sees no reason for changing the system that has managed to sustain it in power thus far. The centralizing juggernaut of the Malaysian federal government first reared its head when it abolished local government elections in 1965.[43] A year later the federal government interfered in the internal politics of Sarawak, which had just joined the Malaysian federation in 1963, by helping to engineer the ouster of Sarawak's first Chief Minister and a vocal advocate for autonomy, Stephen Kalong Ningkan (more

39 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2007). See also J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2003), pp. 268–379.

40 R. William Liddle, "Regime: The New Order" in Donald Emmerson, ed. Indonesia Beyond Suharto (Armonk and London: An East Gate Book, 1999), pp. 39–70.

41 Greg Fealy and Edward Aspinall, eds., Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).

42 Francis Loh Kok Wah, Old vs New Politics in Malaysia: State and Society in Transition (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2009), pp. 16–20; Mohamad Agus Yusoff, Malaysian Federalism: Conflict or Consensus (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2006); Francis Loh Kok Wah, ed., Sabah and Sarawak: The Politics of Development and Federalism (Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1997); Shafruddin, The Federal Factor.

43 Report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry into the Working of Local Governments in West Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1972).

details on this particular episode in Chapter 4). From the constitutional point of view, the oversight of Islamic affairs solidly resides within the authority of the sultan and the State Islamic Council (*Majlis Agama Islam Negeri*) in each state in Malaysia. Nevertheless, as we shall see throughout this book, the federal government's dominance over Islamic affairs is unmistakably apparent, even in a state such as Kelantan, which has long prided itself on its unique Islamic traditions and legacy (see Chapter 3). The centralizing efforts over Islamic affairs took on an acute sense of urgency in the late 1970s as the hitherto secular state faced strident opposition from Islamic political activists who questioned its legitimacy. Instead of quashing the Islamic dissent and remaining secular, the already highly centralized state decided to bring Islamic affairs under its control as a way to mould the Islamic discourse into a version that buttressed its legitimacy. Islamic affairs, the final preserve of state autonomy in Malaysia, has now been subsumed by the federal government hell-bent on burnishing its religious credibility to govern.

Functionalization of Islamic education in the Muslim world

Historically, attempts by Muslim rulers in the pre-nation state era to co-opt Islamic education as a means to strengthen their legitimacy were complicated by the nature of traditional Islamic education, which was decentralized, informal, and highly autonomous. The advent of modern state-making in the late nineteenth century, which included a comprehensive attempt at codifying syariah laws by the Ottoman Empire, led to a major revamp of traditional Islamic education across the Middle East.[44] Throughout most of Islamic history, Islamic

44 The pedagogical method in traditional Islamic education is generally similar across the Muslim world, which, among others, places heavy emphasis on rote memorization and recitation of seminal texts, oral transmission of knowledge with a clear intellectual genealogy (teacher-focus), no regular exams, and no fixed curriculum and schooling term. For an overview of traditional Islamic learning, see Jonathan Berkey, "Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, Education, and the Problem of Muslim Identity" in Robert Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 40–58. For a vividly detailed account of traditional Islamic learning in Yemen, see Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 75–98. For Morocco, see Dale Eickelman, Knowledge and Power in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). For Indonesia, see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java (Tempe: Monograph Series Press, Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1999), pp. 1–13; Karel Steenbrink. Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Moderen (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986); and Azyumardi Azra, Surau: Pendidikan Islam Tradisional dalam Transisi dan Modernisasi (Jakarta: Logos, 2003), pp. 97–106. For Malaysia, see William Roff, "Pondoks, Madrasahs and the Production of 'Ulama' in Malaysia" in William Roff, Studies on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009) and Rosnani Hashim, Educational Dualism in Malaysia: Implications for Theory and Practice (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2004), pp. 21–28.

jurisprudence has been a wide-open field replete with diversity of opinions and vigorous debates among jurists; the existing four Sunni *madhhabs* (schools of thought) – Hambali, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanafi – are a prime example of this long-standing tradition of scholarship. The interpretive authority, defined as the intellectual and moral credibility to clarify and shed meanings on Islamic precepts contained in the Quran and Hadith (reported sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad), was widely dispersed and decentralized throughout much of Islamic history, with no group holding sway over others.[45] But the late nineteenth century saw rapid codification of syariah law, particularly within the realm of the Ottoman Empire.[46] This codification served as a means for the Empire to streamline administration across its vast and disparate territories, and was a desperate attempt to beat back the encroaching Western colonialism by "modernizing" its legal system to make it less capricious, so as to prevent the Western powers using it as a pretext to interfere in the Empire's internal affairs.[47] The European-influenced positivist nature of the codification of syariah law within the realm of the Ottoman Empire, in turn, spurred the establishment of Islamic educational systems that produced Muslim scholars who were well-trained in the workings of the newly established syariah codes called *Majalla*.[48] The power to interpret Islamic tenets, at the turn of twentieth century, shifted significantly from the jurists of yore to the graduates of this newly established education system. The codified syariah law required its practitioners to possess a specific set of skills to interpret and enforce the law that was unavailable to the students of the traditional learning system. The field of Islamic jurisprudence, which previously had been wide open and dynamic, was now circumscribed within the limiting confines of the codified syariah law and its practitioners by the early decades of the twentieth century. Therefore, the Islamic education system unwittingly became a battleground in which supremacy over the Islamic religious interpretive authority was fought. Since Islamic matters were decided through this newly codified syariah law system, the graduates of the Islamic education system who were trained in understanding and discharging these laws became the holders of the religious interpretive authority. Thus, the newly standardized Islamic education system became an arena of ideological contestation as

45 Khaled Abou El-Fadl, Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (Oxford: Oneworld Press, 2001), pp. 23–69; Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke. Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 1–14.

46 At this point in history the Ottoman Empire was the de facto ruler of the Muslim world, a caliphate that spanned from Central Asia to North Africa. Its reach, though, was uneven and it ruled mainly through indirect means, which made it futile to impose uniform rule across its huge swath of territory.

47 El-Fadl, Speaking in God's Name, pp. 16–17; William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), p. 84; Messick, The Calligraphic State, pp. 54–66.

48 Berkey, Madrasas Medieval and Modern; Clark Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of Shari'a into Egyptian Constitutional Law (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Messick, The Calligraphic State, pp. 55–58, 101–107.

the state and various social actors tried to shape its content and pedagogical culture, and consequently determine the type of graduates that the system produced.[49]

Since the advent of modern state-making in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, all modern Muslim-majority states have deemed the functionalization of Islamic education to be integral to regime maintenance and legitimacy as they confront the challenges of modernization, post-colonial nation-building, and presently, the forces of globalization.[50] Functionalization refers to "processes of translation in which intellectual objects from one [Islamic] discourse come to serve the strategic or utilitarian ends of another [Islamic] discourse that is amendable to the state".[51] In this case, the implications that state-making and regime maintenance have for Islamic education have generally been in the shape of structural changes: the abolition or radical overhaul of the traditional Islamic education or its incorporation into a more coherent and homogenous national educational system. Notably in Oman, which was the focus of his study, Dale Eickelman lists three effects as Muslim states in the Middle East have embarked on the grand project of standardizing and nationalizing mass education, including Islamic education, among their population since the 1950s.[52] These effects result in the creation of authoritative discourse through selective access to texts and teachers; the transformation of religion as a concrete system and its ideas reified and objectified; and last, standardized language and ideas of mass education that encourage a sense of affinity among the students, not unlike the notion of "imagined community" put forth by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work on nationalism.[53] In a nutshell, Eickelman contends that the post-colonial mass education project in the Middle East has turned Islamic intellectual tradition from its aforementioned autonomous, amorphous and fluid character to something that is concrete, rational, and systematic (objectified and reified). The objectification of Islam and Islamic learning narrowly circumscribes Islamic discourse into this newly delimited space and creates a clearly defined standard of ideals promoted by the post-colonial state. In practice, however, states' attempts at functionalizing Islamic education for the purposes of regime maintenance often do not attain their desired results, which is to shape public opinion in the regimes' favour. In the same study of Islamic education trends in selected Arab countries, Eickelman observes that "even when mass

49 For an example of the modernization of Islamic education in Yemen, see Messick, The Calligraphic State.

50 Robert Hefner, "The Politics and Cultures of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia" in Robert Hefner, ed., The Making of Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), pp. 42–43.

51 Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 9–10.

52 Dale Eickelman, "Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies", American Ethnologist 19.4 (November 1992), pp. 646–647.

53 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London and New York: Verso, 1983).

higher education is used to sustain old patterns of belief and authority, its very structure engenders new 'authoritative' ways of thinking about self, religion, and politics".[54] The new "authoritative" way, in this context, can either lead to the strengthening of a state's ideological hegemony or the empowerment of countervailing ideological forces hostile to the state. Both outcomes will be illustrated in some detail in the next section.

State functionalization of Islamic education in the Muslim world

In the wake of the objectification of Islam and the conversion of syariah principles into positive law, beginning in the late-nineteenth-century Middle East, mass education has become a hotly contested arena for interpretive authority between the modernizing Muslim-majority state and various religiously inspired socio-political movements. In Egypt, for example, in the 1950s, the Free Officers' Revolution led by Gamal Nasser replaced the traditional educational system, long known for its polyvocality of Islamic knowledge and interpretive authority, with the attempted hegemony of a single national educational system. This attempt aimed to fuse the state's interpretation of Islam, Arab nationalism and socialism into a single ideology.[55] In the aftermath of the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967, which resulted in the defeat of the Arab forces, the general public mood in Egypt soured on Nasser's Arab nationalism project and many people began to turn to Islam for a political alternative. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, promptly capitalized on the Islamic resurgence trend within Egyptian society by actively promoting Islamic symbols in public (along with releasing many Muslim Brotherhood activists from prison and, in light of the heightened Cold War, re-orientating the regime's political and economic compass to the West and capitalism).[56] However, as Gregory Starrett shows, the state's initiative in fact had the unintended consequence of diminishing its authority and control of public discourse over the years, giving rise to Islamist movements that were opposed to the state, which, in turn, led to their violent repression.[57] In short, the state's attempt at functionalizing Islam and Islamic education, both during the Nasser and Sadat eras, did not achieve its desired results.

The same can be said for Iran, where the modernizing efforts carried out by the Shahs, which also included a major overhaul of the traditional education system and marginalization of Islamic education, failed to keep the monarchy in power and prevent the 1979 revolution, which was in large part fuelled by the students of the Islamic schools or *hawzah*. In the Shah's case, he underestimated the potency of Islamic opposition to his rule, particularly in the traditional Shiite

54 Eickelman, Mass Higher Education, p. 645.

55 Starrett, Putting Islam to Work, pp. 77–80; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 30.

56 Starrett, Putting Islam to Work, pp. 80–86.

57 Ibid., pp. 220–33.

educational centres such as Qom, which ultimately contributed to his downfall.[58] The Imamate leadership that succeeded the Shah realized early on the sheer importance of using schools to inculcate the young Iranian minds with revolutionary ideals and reinforce the political socialization the students received outside of the school. The religious leaders of the 1979 revolution cast it as an "ideological revolution", which aimed to shake up the cultural foundation of the country, as opposed to a "non-ideological revolution" that only seeks change in political leadership.[59] The republic's leadership promptly revamped the national curriculum and textbooks to include new normative ideals of what a citizen of the new Islamic republic should be.[60] According to one author, the state's effort to instil revolutionary ideals through the education system has been generally successful, partly due to the Imamate leadership enjoying a high degree of legitimacy from the public. The schools serve as a complementary socializing agent, which helps to reinforce values learned through families, mosques, and workplaces. In other words, there is a high ideological congruity between what is going inside and outside of the schools, which leads to a relatively seamless process of values inculcation.[61]

Turkey, despite its staunchly secular nature throughout most of the twentieth century, has also tried to functionalize Islamic education to further strengthen state legitimacy since Islam remains a vital component of the daily lives of most Turkish people. Secularism, in the Turkish context, does not mean the complete separation of religion and state; instead, the state allows a role for religion in the public sphere as long as the state controls and defines what the proper functions of the said role are.[62] In other words, the Turkish state arrogates to itself the interpretive authority to articulate and enforce what it deems to be "Turkish Islam", which is comprised of three components: Islam that is devoid of "superstitious" and

58 David Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992). Bassam Tibi speculates, "If the Shah had had the Shi'i clergy [most of them were also heads of the traditional Islamic schools] as allies, the Westernized intellectuals could not have succeeded in polarizing the country and ousting him". Bassam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), p. 109.

59 Golnar Mehran, "Ideology and Education in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Compare 20.1 (1990), p. 53.

60 The author, who was a high-ranking officer of the Iranian Ministry of Education, states that some of the main ideals propagated by the state include "strengthening the beliefs of students with respect to: a) oneness to God; b) prophethood and revelation; c) resurrection and its constructive role in the journey of human beings toward God; d) justice of God; e) Imamate and the leadership of the pure Imams; and f) the dignity of humanity, its superior role, its freedom and its responsibility before God". Bahram Mohsenpour, "Philosophy of Education in Postrevolutionary Iran" Comparative Education Review 32.1 (February 1988), p. 85. See also Mehran, "Ideology and Education", pp. 61–62; M. Mobin Shorish, "The Islamic Revolution and Education in Iran" Comparative Education Review 32.1 (February 1988), pp. 59–60.

61 Shorish, The Islamic Revolution, pp. 72–75.

62 Kim Shively, "Taming Islam: Studying Religion in Secular Turkey", Anthropological Quarterly 81.3 (Summer 2008), p. 684.

"backward" elements; modernism; and nationalism.[63] The ideals of "Turkish Islam" saturate the curriculum content of religious studies in state schools, which the state hopes is enough to mollify those Muslims who seek an Islamic education within the state school system. Nevertheless, as Kim Shively vividly demonstrates in her ethnographic study of the informal Quranic study group in the suburb of Ankara in the late 1990s, the state's instrumental efforts at repurposing Islamic education for its own ideological ends were met by pious Muslims with deep suspicions and dissatisfaction at the inadequacy and overly general content of the religious studies curriculum. Muslims in search of more substantive and meaningful religious education increased enrolments in the state-sanctioned Imam-Hatip schools and private Islamic schools such as the ones in the Fethullah Gülen educational network.[64] In short, the secular state's effort to co-opt and remake Islamic education in its image throughout the twentieth century had failed, and similar to the aforementioned case in Egypt, spawned a galvanized Islamic oppositional force within the society, which culminated in the electoral dominance of the Islamic party, Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002.

Mass education in Pakistan has seen a significant philosophical overhaul since the late 1970s when then President, Zia-ul-Haq, utilized Islamic discourse to buttress the legitimacy of his presidency and win public support for Pakistan's role in the Soviet-Afghan war. Pakistan's National Educational Policy in 1998 stated that "the ideology of Islam forms the genesis of the state of Pakistan. The country cannot survive and advance without placing the entire system of education on sound Islamic foundations".[65] The state's Islamic ideology here conflates the national identity of being a Pakistani and the Islamic faith. The identity of a Pakistani Muslim, a redundancy in the official view, is defined against others who do not fit the ideals laid out by the state, be they foreigners (namely Hindu Indians), non-Muslim Pakistanis or fellow Muslims who happen not to share a deeply conservative religious outlook.[66] The intensification of conservative Islamic influence in the Pakistani society during the Zia-ul-Haq period also resulted in the preservation and growth of traditional madrasah. Some of these madrasah housed many of the Afghan refugees fleeing across the border and also

63 Jocelyne Cesari, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 88–89; Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper, "Religion, Education and Continuity in a Provincial Town" in Richard Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 62–74; Bahattin Akşit, "Islamic Education in Turkey: Medrese Reform in Late Ottoman Times and Imam-Hatip Schools in the Republic" in Richard Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 162–164.

64 The increasing enrollment rate in Islamic schools in turn led to the state crackdown to reverse the trend. Shively, Taming Islam, pp. 697–705.

65 Quoted in Naureen Durrani and Máiréad Dunne, "Curriculum and National Identity: Exploring the Links between Religion and Nation in Pakistan", Journal of Curriculum Studies 42.2 (2010), p. 222.

66 Ibid., pp. 224–233.

produced students who went to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Many of these madrasah students later ended up forming the highly repressive Taliban government in the newly liberated Afghanistan while still maintaining links with some of the traditional madrasahs in Pakistan.[67]

The obvious overall pattern here is that despite the best effort by states to manage the Islamic education system and co-opt the Islamic discourse, the highly Islamized public sphere that stems from state-sanctioned religious education might unintentionally result in the strengthening of countervailing Islamic social forces, which can put a damper on the states' efforts to use Islamic education as a means for social control and maintaining their legitimacy. As discussed previously, the relationship between the state and the society is a dialectical one in which components of both constantly influence and reconstitute one another. The question then is what are the ways that allow the state to gain an upper hand in this dialectical interaction, at least within the realm of Islamic education, where it can exert its ideological hegemony while minimizing the pressure from the social forces. When it comes to Islamic education in Malaysia, the state has been powerful and adaptable enough so that it is able to shape the nature of social resistance against its attempts to promote its version of Islamic values and principles in the curriculum. For example, Islamic schools that are suspicious of the state's Islamization effort in the educational arena might still appropriate the state-issued curriculum and pedagogical methods and make them more genuinely Islamic as an act of defiance against the state's claim of interpretive authority, a form of hidden curriculum mentioned in the previous section.[68] Nevertheless, it is a resistance that is shaped by the discursive boundary set by the state Islamic orthodoxy. In Indonesia, on the other hand, no such dynamics occur since the pluralist nature of the state Islamic orthodoxy allows Islamic schools a broad autonomy in interpreting the national curriculum based on their ideals, not the discursive boundary set by the state. In short, the state's ability to functionalize Islamic education as a means to exert its ideological hegemony depends on how effective it can manage the Islamic discourse without resorting to full-on repression.

Islamic orthodoxy and the functionalization of Islamic education

In order to better elucidate the notion of functionalization of Islamic education in a Muslim-majority country we need to discern the values and norms the state

67 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Tradition and Authority in Deobandi Madrasas in South Asia" in Robert Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 71; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 22–24.

68 Fida Adely and Gregory Starrett, "Schools, Skills, and Morals in the Contemporary Middle East" in Bradley Levinson and Mica Pollock, eds., A Companion to the Anthropology of Education (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 351.

wants to propagate in the Islamic education curriculum, how and why these values make their way into policymaking, and how embedded and influential their role is within the state institutions overseeing Islamic education. In other words, we need to identify what is the state's *Islamic orthodoxy*. This book contends that the different state Islamic orthodoxies one can find in Indonesia and Malaysia influence the three factors that shape these states' ability to deal with pressures from social groups. As mentioned before, functionalization of Islamic education is part of the state's attempt to monopolize religious interpretive authority especially when the state's legitimacy precariously rests on having a religiously favourable image in the eyes of the Muslim public, which is the case in Malaysia but not Indonesia. The conventional notion of orthodoxy proposes the state to develop its own interpretation of Islam, socialize that interpretation widely among the public through mass education, and mete out proscriptions and punishments against alternative interpretations. The idea that a state Islamic orthodoxy is essentially a form of power dynamic is described by Talal Asad:

> Orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship – a relationship of power. Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy.[69]

To merely explain orthodoxy in terms of a linear power relationship where the state unilaterally imposes its ideological will on the society at large is to overlook the complex process that gives shape and substance to the orthodox values and norms. Foucault's comment in the previous section regarding the web-like structure of power relations between the state and the society and the production of "truth" forms the basis on which the idea of orthodoxy is developed. One very detailed definition of orthodoxy describes it as

> [a] superordinate compulsory organisation composed of a leading class in cahoots with other classes and social groups that 1) controls the means of material, intellectual, and symbolic production; 2) articulates "correct" forms of belief and praxis through the work of rationalizing and consent-generating intellectuals (and/or priests); 3) identifies "incorrect" forms of belief and praxis through these same intellectuals; 4) institutionally manages deviant individuals and groups through coercive mechanisms (e.g., physical and symbolic violence, excessive taxation, ostracism, etc.) or through "re-education," compromise, accommodation, and so on.[70]

69 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, DC: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986), p. 15.

70 Jacques Berlinerblau, "Toward a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa", History of Religions 40.4 (May 2001), p. 340.

This definition of orthodoxy is only partially complete when applied to the context of this book's argument as religious orthodoxy is not necessarily related to dominating and controlling other religious points of view, as we shall see in the Indonesian case. As stated before, state functionalization of Islamic education assumes different shapes and meanings depending on the political exigencies of the particular time and place in history. Therefore, it is also instructive to analyse Islamic orthodoxy in a similar light, namely in construing orthodoxy and its contents "[a]s fluid, as developing in a dialectic with heterodoxy".[71] Orthodox values and norms change over time in direct relation with the prevailing pluralist ideas and practices, and with regard to state functionalization of Islamic education; these changes can be seen in official policies, the contents of curricula, textbooks and teachers' training manuals, and the types of enforcement at the local level.

In the case of Malaysia, the critical juncture that is the start of the Islamization wave in the late 1970s, entailed abrupt institutional change, resulting in the reconfiguration of orthodox values and the rise of conservative brand of state Islamic orthodoxy. The Islamized society since the late 1970s presented a potent challenge to the state's legitimacy by framing the public discourse in an Islamic context, and thus prompted the state institutions to change and adapt. Similar institutional dynamics did not happen in Indonesia. The state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia remains moderate and is still shaped by plurality of Islamic practices in the society. In Malaysia, the state leaders determined they needed to co-opt or quash competing values and norms with co-optation being the preferred strategy as it lowers the cost of governance; highly repressive strategies tend to generate hostility and resentment in society. In Indonesia by contrast, the Islamization of the society that occurred in the 1980s did not pose a similar threat to the legitimacy of the New Order regime. The Islamic resurgence mostly made its presence felt in the socio-cultural sphere, which in turn strengthened the pre-existing ideological diversity within the Indonesian Muslim society.[72] It is the dominance of diversity of values in the society that ultimately shape the character of state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia.

In addition, state institutions are also not immune to significant changes within the society. Change agents can infiltrate into the state institutions at the same time that the institutions are undergoing change in values and norms, in which case, the presence of change agents (a topic we return to below) within the institutions can hasten the institutional identity transformation process. Institutional complexity, a concept that will be discussed later in this chapter, also plays a crucial role in determining the ideological cohesiveness of a state institu-

71 Ibid., p. 332.

72 See Aswab Mahasin, "The Santri Middle Class: An Insider View" in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990); Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society", pp. 8–12; Hefner, Civil Islam; Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia.

tion. In a nutshell, the more complex the inter- and intra-relations between and within state institutions the less ideologically cohesive the state is, which this book argues lead to the formation of a more moderate and multifaceted state Islamic orthodoxy, such as the one we see in Indonesia. The opposite argument can also be used to explain the formation and strength of the state Islamic orthodoxy in Malaysia.

To illustrate, the Malaysian educational policies during the first twenty years after independence in 1957 were predominantly secular in orientation but underwent a drastic change in the late 1970s and early 1980s during the early years of the Islamic resurgence trend in the society (more discussion on this in Chapter 2). This was a point of critical juncture that upset the existing institutional ideology and identity, and made state institutions become more conservative and Islamic. The values and norms of the state Islamic orthodoxy were developed in the 1980s by the policymakers within the government, spearheaded by the chief architect of the Islamization process, Anwar Ibrahim, whom the former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, recruited away from the opposition-friendly Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*, ABIM). This process occurred in a constant discursive engagement with the Islamic ideas and principles of PAS, the opposition Islamic party that was challenging the regime on the grounds that it lacked religious legitimacy to govern.[73] As the interplay of religious discourse between the state and its Islamic opposition produced more conservatism, so did the official orthodoxy which it engendered.[74] These orthodox values and norms were then incorporated into the mass education system as the state tried to employ every means at its disposal to gain an upper hand in its battle of religious discourse with the opposition. The monolithic character of the state Islamic orthodoxy in Malaysia in turn allowed the state to exert more centralized control over Islamic education.

Meanwhile in Indonesia, the Islamic revivalism that radically altered the socio-political landscape in Malaysia in the late 1970s barely made a ripple in the society, at least not until about a decade later. Even then, the identity and

73 Maznah Mohamad contended that rising Islamization of Malaysian bureaucracy should not only be seen from the perspective of political rivalry between UMNO and PAS but also the Islamic bureaucracy's own rational objective to monopolize the way Islam is practised in Malaysia. Maznah Mohamad, "The Ascendance of Bureaucratic Islam and the Secularization of Sharia in Malaysia", Pacific Affairs 83.3 (September 2010), pp. 505–524.

74 Maznah Mohamad, "Legal-Bureaucratic Islam in Malaysia: Homogenizing and Ring-fencing the Muslim Subject" in Hui Yew-Foong, ed., Encountering Islam: The Politics of Religious Identities in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), pp. 106–109; Joseph Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 43–72; Joseph Liow, "Political Islam in Malaysia: problematising discourse and practice in the UMNO-PAS 'Islamisation race' ", Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 42.2 (2004), pp. 184–205; Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics of Islam in Contemporary Malaysia (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2003), pp. 180–211; Farish Noor, "Blood, Sweat and Jihad: The Radicalization of the Political Discourse of PAS from 1982 Onwards", Contemporary Southeast Asia 25.2 (2003), p. 205.

ideology of the institution overseeing Islamic education (MORA) remained unaffected and the influence of the arbiter of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, MUI, also did not increase despite the apparent rise in pietism among the Indonesian Muslim population from about the mid-1980s.[75] The multifaceted nature of state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia is an indication of a state that is more divided and penetrable by various Islamic groups with ideologies that run the gamut from the progressive Jaringan Islam Liberal to the mainstream Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to the deeply conservative Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Front Pembela Islam. In short, both the states in Indonesia and Malaysia encountered a similar exogenous pressure – Islamic revivalism – but they came up with starkly different responses, producing very different state Islamic orthodoxies.

Islamic orthodoxy and state institutions

A state Islamic orthodoxy by definition must be promoted by state institutions as a means of controlling religious discourse. In order to explore the nature of the Islamic orthodoxy propagated by a state at any particular moment in time – in this book we are concerned with the Islamization period in Indonesia and Malaysia from the late 1970s onward – we need to consider the political utility for the state in formulating and institutionalizing certain values that make up the state Islamic orthodoxy. One important aspect of orthodoxy is its characteristic as an "institutionalized ideology", meaning attempts at monopolizing religious discourse through formal coercive powers of the state apparatus.[76] In other words, orthodoxy can only function within the framework of state institutions, which renders it official. While Islamic orthodoxies have existed since the beginning of Islam, the use of orthodoxy to prop up regime legitimacy in the Muslim world was irregular and capricious since the orthodoxy itself was highly dependent on the influence of the individual ruler and the feudal kingdom of the day. It was the rise of modern states in the Muslim world in the late 1800s with their attendant bureaucracies that gave orthodoxy a stable institutional home and provided its enforcers with more intrusive and coherent coercive powers. In short, an interpretation of Islam only becomes an orthodoxy if a state adopts it. In the words of Hamid Dabashi, "it is the political success of a given interpretive reading that renders a religious position 'orthodox' ".[77]

Since we have already established that Islamic values have to be ensconced within the state institutional structure to render them an orthodoxy, now we want to look at how and why the states in Indonesia and Malaysia adopt different

75 Hefner, Civil Islam.

76 George Zito, "Toward a Sociology of Heresy", Sociological Analysis 44.2 (Summer 1983), p. 124.

77 Hamid Dabashi, Authority in Islam: From the Rise of Muhammad to the Establishment of the Umayyads (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1989), p. 71.

types of Islamic orthodoxy. As mentioned before, this book contends that institutional objectives and institutional complexity play a crucial role when it comes to determining the nature of state Islamic orthodoxy. The Malaysian and Indonesia cases clearly illustrate the ways these two factors shape the nature of Islamic orthodoxy and its influence in the field of Islamic education. JAKIM represents the face of Islamic orthodoxy in Malaysia and enjoys the status as an official component of the state with the clear purpose of Islamizing the state bureaucracy and the society, along with guarding the sanctity of Islam in the country.[78] JAKIM, along with the state religious authorities, has at its disposal the means of coercion, which then allows it a monopoly on religious ideas and practices; in other words, it enjoys hegemonic control over religious interpretive authority.[79] Therefore, Islamic values promoted by JAKIM are indistinguishable from the ones adopted by other state institutions. All the relevant state institutions share a clear institutional objective and cohesion.[80] The hegemonic influence of JAKIM's orthodox values is evident in the curriculum content of the Islamic Studies subject (*Pendidikan Islam*) at the senior high school level, which will be discussed in detail in the next sub-section.

In Indonesia, MUI, on the other hand, is a membership-based organization and only a semi-official part of the state in Indonesia, with the proverbial other foot planted in the society. As such, MUI lacks a core clarity of institutional purpose beyond certain policy areas such as halal certification and Islamic banking.[81] When it comes to instilling the state with its religious values, MUI often finds itself at odds with other institutions within the state due to its deeply conservative views. MUI is not empowered with the state's means of coercion to implement and enforce its orthodox values, unlike its counterpart, JAKIM, in Malaysia. MUI also faces challenges to its claim for interpretive authority from major Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which are far more moderate and arguably more influential than MUI. Hence,

78 "Putrajaya: Jakim benteng negara tangani Syiah, Islam liberal, IS", Malay Mail Online, 10 November 2015 (accessed 10 November 2015); "Who else can defend Islam if not Jakim, says director-general", The Malaysian Insider, 18 November 2015 (accessed on 18 November 2015).

79 "Jakim critic Tawfik Ismail faces sedition probe", The Malaysian Insider, 24 November 2015 (accessed on 24 November 2015); "In trial project, PDRM to deploy officers, sergeants to assist Jais in Shariah enforcement", Malay Mail Online, 28 April 2016 (accessed on 16 May 2016).

80 The ideological agreement between the centre (JAKIM) and the periphery (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri) is best exemplified in a recent concerted condemnation against G25, a moderate Islamic group consists of retired high-ranking Malay civil servants, which calls for the dissolution of JAKIM. "Abolish G25, says Kedah mufti", Malaysiakini, 9 December 2015 (accessed on 9 December 2015).

81 "Gus Mus: MUI Itu Sebenarnya Makhluk Apa?" Tempo, 1 April 2015 (accessed on 15 June 2015); Tim Lindsey, "Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the 'Islamic Economy'". Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 48:2 (July 2012), pp. 264–272; H. Wahiduddin Adams, "Fatwa MUI dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-Undangan" in Fatwa MUI dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-Undangan (Jakarta: Puslitbang Lektur dan Khazanah Keagamaan, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, 2012), pp. 593–597.

despite MUI's claim to be the voice of orthodoxy in Indonesia, the reality reveals a more contested arena where plurality of Islamic interpretations retain major influence. The lack of a clearly defined institutional objective and ideological fragmentation between various state institutions, which result in the dominance of multifaceted practices, define the values of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia and its pluralist ideals (more discussion on this in Chapter 2). The curriculum of the Islamic Knowledge (*Pengetahuan Agama Islam*) subject at the senior high school level is a clear reflection of these pluralist and more moderate values, as opposed to the more monolithic and conservative values one finds in similar curriculum in Malaysia. Simply put, in Malaysia, Islamic orthodox values are homogenous and consistent throughout the state and society; in Indonesia they are varied and highly contested with diversity of practices in the society exercising continuing influence.

Orthodox values in the Islamic education curriculum in Indonesia and Malaysia

There is plenty of topical overlap between the *Pengetahuan Agama Islam* curriculum in Indonesia and the *Pendidikan Islam* curriculum in Malaysia, both of which are taught at the senior high school level. The topics mainly revolve around matters of faith (*aqidah*), marriage and family, personal conduct, history of Islamic civilization, history of Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia, and Muslim communal life, which includes governance and citizenship. These common topics, however, are where the similarity ends since the values that inform the content of the common topics are very different. The need of the state in Malaysia to legitimize itself from the Islamic perspective and the state's response to the growing religious conservatism in the society are manifested in the religious values incorporated in the *Pendidikan Islam* curriculum. Likewise, the lack of political utility of Islam as a regime legitimizing force and the prevalent multifaceted Islamic practices in the Indonesian society allow the *Pengetahuan Agama Islam* curriculum to adopt a more moderate and inclusive interpretation when it comes to defining the religious values embedded within the curriculum.

We will look at three common topics to illustrate the differences in Islamic values and interpretations in the two countries' curricula: faith (*aqidah*), marriage, and governance/civic responsibilities. Examples are drawn from the study guidebooks for *Pengetahuan Agama Islam* and *Pendidikan Islam* at the senior high school level, which are widely available in major bookstores in both countries. When it comes to *aqidah*, it is clear that pluralist values are dominant in the Indonesian curriculum. For instance, the curriculum sees freedom of religion and religious pluralism as a human right and an essential component of the Indonesia's state motto *Bhineka Tunggal Eka* (Unity in Diversity). One textbook for senior high schools, by using Quranic interpretations from Surah Al-Kahf verse 29 and Surah Al-Baqarah verse 256, states that: "In dealing with the differences in faith and religious practices, Muslims and non-Muslims must have the freedom of religion and to conduct the teachings of their religions, and cannot

interfere in each other's affairs. Islam forbids compulsion in religion".[82] In regard to religious pluralism and the need for heterodox practices in fostering a tolerant society, the textbook states: "We have to realize that the words of God are very broad and multi-interpretative, so much so that we have to be aware of and respect the existence of many streams within a religion".[83] In contrast, the curriculum for *Pendidikan Islam* in Malaysia contains no such endorsements of pluralism. It is very specific when it comes to defining what constitutes as the real teaching of Islam and what groups are considered deviants. The only acceptable version of Islam is the *Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah* (followers of Quran and the reported practices of the prophet Muhammad) version and Islamic sects such as the Shia, Khawarij, Qadiyani (Ahmadiyah), Bahai and Taslim are categorized as deviant teachings (*ajaran sesat*).[84] Furthermore, according to the curriculum there is no freedom of religion for Muslims and conversion out of Islam is punishable by death.[85] This stands in sharp contrast to the previously mentioned example in the Indonesian textbook that does not list any deviant Islamic groups and places a strong emphasis on non-compulsion in Islam.

The topic of marriage is another example where we can tease out the differences in interpretation and ideological orientation between the curricula for Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia. Two glaring omissions, among others, in the Indonesian textbook can be found in its Malaysian counterpart: the right of a husband to hit his wife, and polygamy. The Malaysian version explicitly permits the husband to hit his wife due to *nusyuz* (disobedience), which includes the wife's refusal to have sex with the husband, leaving the house without the husband's permission, behaving badly against the husband, disobeying the orders of her husband, and allowing an unrelated man into the house without the husband's knowledge.[86] Instead of *nusyuz*, the Indonesian textbook places emphasis on the equality in marriage by stating that both husband and

82 The original excerpt: "Dalam menyikapi perbedaan keimanan dan peribadahan itu, umat Islam dan kaum kafir hendaknya bebas beragama dan menjalankan ajaran agama yang dianutnya, dan tidak boleh saling mengganggu. Islam melarang memaksa orang lain untuk menganut sesuatu agama". Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMA Kelas XII (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2007), p. 4.

83 The original excerpt: "Kita harus sadar bahwa firman Allah swt., sangat luas dan multitafsir sehingga perlu sama-sama menyadari dan menghormati lahirnya berbagai aliran dalam satu agama". Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMK dan MAK Kelas XII (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2011), p. 11.

84 Success Pendidikan Islam SPM (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Fajar, 2012), pp. 201–208.

85 The study guidebook even lists four benefits why death sentence is appropriate for apostasy: 1) as a warning that Islam is not a religion which can be toyed with; 2) to prevent Muslim community from breaking up and becoming chaotic; 3) to stop any acts that belittle and besmirch Islam; and 4) to prevent apostasy from defiling the greatness of Islam [author's translation]. Nexus Tuntas SPM 4–5: Pendidikan Islam (Petaling Jaya: Sasbadi Sdn. Bhd., 2014), p. 47.

86 According to the book, the husband has to follow these criteria when hitting his wife: 1) not using too much force that can cause injuries; 2) not hitting sensitive body parts such as face and stomach; 3) only hit with the objective of teaching the wife a lesson and making her atone for her mistakes; and 4) hitting with a non-lethal implement [author's translation]. Success Pendidikan Islam SPM, p. 229.

wife have equal rights and status in a marriage and should be treated equally in the eyes of law.[87] While the practice of polygamy is legal for Muslim men in Indonesia, the textbook simply does not discuss the issue under the broad topic of marriage. In contrast, the *Pendidikan Islam* subject in Malaysia devotes one lesson plan to the matter of polygamy, essentially sanctioning the practice as long as the man fulfils all the requirements, which are: not having more than four wives, acting justly with all the wives, and being physically and financially capable.[88] These two issues – the right of a husband to hit his wife and polygamy – represent a conservative interpretation of Islam, which is clearly the ideals espoused by the curriculum in Malaysia; their omissions in the Indonesia curriculum, conversely, are an indicator of a more moderate Islamic interpretation.

The topic of governance/civic responsibilities is another telling illustration of whether Islam serves a political utility to the state's sense of legitimacy. Treatment of the topic can indicate whether the state is using an Islamic interpretation to justify the political status quo. In the Indonesian curriculum, there is no evident attempt by the state to use Islamic values to prop up its legitimacy and extract compliance from the Muslim populace. The only lesson plan concerning citizenship and governance mainly touches on how the plural Indonesian society can remain united and harmonious while people respect each other's differences. There is no mention of the relationship between the citizenry and the political leadership.[89] Meanwhile, the Malaysian curriculum lists a host of citizens' responsibilities toward their political leaders, namely: obedience (which must be provided as long as one is not forced by the leaders to commit sins); unconditional support even if one does not like the leaders; and advising the leaders through proper and closed channels so as not to publicly shame them and the country in the eyes of the world.[90] Under the topic of citizenship the Malaysian curriculum also justifies the use of repressive laws to save the country from its enemies and maintain stability.[91] In short, it is clear that the state in Malaysia is actively trying to inculcate values in the Islamic education curriculum that it

87 Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMK dan MAK, p. 67.

88 The lesson plan also lists the benefits of polygamy, which are human reproduction, taking care of orphans and divorcés, preventing vices, and attaining blessing in this life and the hereafter. Ibid., pp. 235–237.

89 Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMK dan MAK, pp. 119–124.

90 The lesson plan also states that the implications for defying the leaders include destabilizing the country, adversely affecting the economy, and giving opportunity for enemies to destroy the country. Success Pendidikan Islam SPM, pp. 311–312. See also "Disloyalty to leader is disloyalty to God, Muslims told in Friday sermon", Malay Mail Online, 18 March 2016 (accessed on 18 March 2016); "Murid perlu ditanam rasa taat pada pemimpin, negara – Mahdzir", Malaysiakini, 30 April 2016 (accessed on 30 April 2016).

91 The lesson plan argues that enemies of the country can be thwarted by keeping surveillance on suspicious activities, taking legal actions against any threatening activities, and establishing preventive laws that can nip the threat in the bud. Ibid., p. 308.

believes can legitimize its rule and preserve the status quo, as opposed to Indonesia, where no such attempt can be found.[92]

The religious values one finds in Islamic education curricula in Indonesia and Malaysia are reflections of the states' dialectic relationships with Muslim society at large. The values found in the Indonesian curriculum reflect the pluralist nature of Islamic practices in the society and the weak saliency of Islam as a rule-legitimizing force. The state in Indonesia does not have to compete with other socio-political Islamic forces for religious credibility, which typically results in a very conservative interpretation of Islam, as we can see in the Malaysian case. The non-ideologically monolithic nature of the state institutions also explains why MUI, as the self-proclaimed arbiter of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, has not been able to exert a more muscular and deep-reaching role in imbuing the state – including the education system – with its conservative values.[93] In essence, there is a low degree of congruency between the values advocated by MUI and the values contained in the curriculum for *Pengetahuan Agama Islam*.[94] Nevertheless, this is also not to say that values found in MORA's *Pengetahuan Agama Islam* curriculum is representative of Indonesian Muslim society as a whole. Pluralist values within Indonesian Muslim society are still highly contested as evidenced by the discrimination and violence against the followers of Ahmadiyah and Shia and church closure controversies in some parts of the country. The fact that these diverse values are in constant state of flux across the society indicates that no one Islamic interpretation holds sway over others. In essence, the pluralist approach of the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia allows

92 There were charges that pro-government views were also incorporated in the senior high school national exam (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia, SPM) questions for Pendidikan Moral, a Pendidikan Islam equivalent subject for non-Muslim students. "Partisan politics in SPM Moral exam?", Malay Mail Online, 19 November 2015 (accessed on 19 November 2015).

93 "Indonesia aims to root out bigotry in schools, mosques", The Jakarta Post, 10 February 2017 (accessed on 13 February 2017).

94 The hardline values propagated by MUI stand in stark contrast to the more moderate ones found in the Pengetahuan Agama Islam curriculum. For example, MUI issued a fatwa in 2005 that declared pluralism, liberalism and secularism to be against the tenets of Islam. MUI had also issued fatwas against Shia and Ahmadiyah groups. Himpunan Fatwa MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2011), pp. 40–41, 46–47, 87–95, 96–99. When it comes to marriage, MUI adopts a patriarchal view that a wife must choose family over career. "Tidak Mentaati Orang Lain Selain Suami", Mimbar Ulama, February 2004, p. 45; "Perkahwinan; Antara Karir dan Keluarga", Mimbar Ulama, May 2004, pp. 42–44. In regard to politics and governance, MUI is highly nationalistic and supports a more centralized Indonesia as it sees decentralization as a precursor to widespread heterodox Islamic practices (and a weakening of its role as the country's arbiter of Islamic values). "Usul Majelis Ulama Terhadap RUU Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah Dan Konsep Satu Atap Mahkamah Agung", Mimbar Ulama, April 1999, pp. 28–29; "Menyoroti RUU Pemerintahan Daerah dan Peradilan Satu Atap: MUI Kembali Datangi DPR", Mimbar Ulama, April 1999, pp. 33–34. Also see Syafiq Hasyim, "Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Pluralism in Indonesia", Philosophy and Social Criticism 41:4–5 (May–June 2015), pp. 490–494.

for Islamic interpretations of all ideological stripes to co-exist and compete with each other.[95]

In contrast, in Malaysia there is a high degree of congruency between the values espoused by JAKIM and the values found in the *Pendidikan Islam* curriculum. JAKIM regularly revises and streamlines the curriculum and textbooks for Islamic education and expects total compliance from teachers and students.[96] JAKIM acts as, borrowing the words of Althusser, the "state ideological apparatus", which tries to reproduce its own Islamic values in the society as a means to legitimize the state's hold on power.[97] A highly religious and deeply conservative Malay-Muslim society partly informs the values held by JAKIM and other state institutions, which the state, in turn, reproduces in the society albeit in a form that is amenable to its political goal, which is to sustain its legitimacy.[98] In other words, a monolithic interpretation of Islamic values shared by both the state and the Malay-Muslim society in Malaysia allows the state to minimize disruptive influence from the Islamic social forces that can challenge its legitimacy, especially the opposition political party PAS.

Institutional identity formation and maintenance

If the analysis of state–society relations is the first prong of this book' theoretical framework, studying institutional dynamics forms the second prong; in particular it uses the conceptual tools provided by the extensive work done in the area of

95 For a more detailed comparison of Islamic orthodoxies found in Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular the comparison between MUI and JAKIM, refer to: Azmil Tayeb, "State Islamic Orthodoxies and Islamic Education in Indonesia and Malaysia", Kajian Malaysia 35.2 (2017), pp. 1–20.

96 Pelan Tindakan Strategik JAKIM 2009–2014: Memacu Transformasi Pengurusan Hal Ehwal Islam (Putrajaya: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, 2009), p. 61.

97 JAKIM's view is clear when it comes to obeying political leaders: "Allah hina rakyat tidak hormat pemimpin, kata Jakim", Malay Mail Online, 11 March 2016 (accessed on 11 March 2016).

98 A Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey by the Pew Research Centre of eleven countries with significant Muslim population that gauges the population's views on ISIS, an international Islamic terror group, shows that higher number of Indonesians (79 per cent) are not in favour of ISIS compared to 64 per cent in Malaysia. More tellingly, 11 per cent of Malaysians have a favourable view of ISIS compared to only 4 per cent in Indonesia. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/ (accessed on 19 November 2015). A 2011 survey by Goethe Institute and Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in collaboration with the Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research in Malaysia showed that almost 81 per cent of Muslim youth (15 to 25 years old) in Malaysia defined themselves as Muslim first, not Malaysian or Malay while more than 70 per cent wanted the Quran to replace the Constitution. www.goethe.de/ins/id/pro/jugendstudie/jugendstudie_en.pdf (accessed on 1 February 2016). These two surveys serve as an indicator of the deep religious conservatism that is prevalent within the Malay-Muslim population in Malaysia.

comparative historical institutionalism.[99] In the context of the argument put forth by this book, the conceptual tools provided by historical institutionalism allow the analysis of state institutions involved in Islamic education throughout the modern history of Indonesia and Malaysia (from the late 1800s to present time), i.e. why these institutions come into existence and act in certain ways at certain periods of time. Historical institutionalism focuses on the role of timing, sequencing and interactions between various socio-political-economic forces (endogenous and exogenous) that lead to the creation of a particular type of institution. An institution, as seen by historical institutionalists, is a product of a "critical juncture", a seminal moment in historical time when the aforementioned factors interact to produce major change. This approach helps to explain why certain institutions come into existence at a certain point in time and not others, and the unique characteristics of the said institutions. By mapping out the process of institutional formation and trajectory in various chapters of history, one can deduce why and how an institution develops a particular identity and behaves in a certain way. Historical institutionalism also looks at the constraints provided by the institutions in moulding not just the behaviour and strategies of political actors but also their goals. In other words, every act of a political actor must be analysed beyond the limited scope of that actor's self-interests since those interests do not appear in a vacuum but must be explained in a larger context, with reference to the role of institutions and their limitations, which again, are significantly influenced by various socio-political-economic forces. According to two leading historical institutionalists, "by shaping not just actors' strategies (as in rational choice), but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes".[100] In short, historical institutionalism contributes to the middle-range theory that "explicitly focuses on intermediate variables in order to integrate an understanding of general patterns of political history with an explanation of the contingent nature of political and

99 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis" in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, eds., James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 305–336; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science" in Political Science: State of the Discipline, eds., Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), pp. 693–721; James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology", Theory and Society 29.4 (August 2000), pp. 521–523; Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

100 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical institutionalism in comparative politics" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 9.

economic development".[101] With regard to the book's argument, the intermediate variables here refer to factors such as the culture and ideology of institutions that deal with Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia, and which affect how these institutions shape the behaviour of actors who actively participate in the Islamic education system and in society at large.

Comparative historical institutionalism also tries to tackle the question of why institutions in general can be resistant to change by introducing the concept of path dependency, defined by Arthur Stinchcombe as "historical causation in which dynamics triggered by an event or process at one point in time reproduce and reinforce themselves even in the absence of recurrence of the original event of process".[102] This essentially means that actions of the past determine the limit and scope of decisions that can be made in the present. The durability of institutional logic (the institution's internal culture and driving philosophy), seen in this analytical light, can be explained through the ability of the institution concerned to adapt and reinforce its norms and beliefs over time as various processes from within and without the particular institution intersect and interact to produce what is called "positive feedback", which, in turn, helps to sustain the institution in the long run.[103] Feedbacks are the causal chains of events that in the end reinforce institutional logic and durability, which explain why some institutions are more resistant to change than others.

Another essential notion introduced by comparative historical institutionalism is "institutional complexity". Institutional complexity refers to the balance of power and the nature of interactions between various components of the state. Dan Slater uses this concept to illustrate the durability of Suharto's New Order regime and its ultimate downfall.[104] The more complex an institution and its interactions with other institutions within the state, the more opportunities provided for vested institutional actors who want to preserve the status quo from forces of change and also for agents of change – from within and without the institution – to alter the status quo; in other words, institutional complexity presents a competitive atmosphere between actors who clamour for change and those who want the institution to remain static. The types of opportunities offered by institutional complexity determine the types of agency that either want to preserve the status quo or challenge it. Slater develops his notion of institutional complexity in the context of authoritarianism, showing how varying institutional arrangements and dynamics provide agentic opportunities and thus prospect for institutional change that can either lead to the durability of the authoritarian regime or its

101 Ibid., p. 28.

102 Paul Pierson, "Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics" in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 195.

103 Ibid., p. 195.

104 Dan Slater, "Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia" in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 132–167.

eventual collapse.[105] Within the narrow scope of this book, the concept of institutional complexity is used as a complementary analytical tool, along with the aforementioned notions of feedbacks and path dependency, to describe the process of ideological formation in state institutions that deal with Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia and the reasons why the institutional ideology manages to persist over time or simply fade into irrelevancy.

Comparative historical institutionalism and Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia

This study aims to explain why, when it comes to exerting its hegemony via Islamic education, the state in Malaysia has been more successful in minimizing the influences from the society than its counterpart in Indonesia. Comparative historical institutionalism is useful in explaining the characteristics needed by the particular state educational agencies involved in Islamic education – i.e. the national ministries and their local offices – to carry out their functions as the ideological apparatus of the state. The conceptual tools provided by comparative historical institutionalism allow us to study the behavioural dynamics of the educational institutions across time and space, dynamics which lead to formulation of different, and on occasions, conflicting types of policies and (non)uniformity of policy implementation and enforcement at the local level. In other words, these tools help us to understand what kind of institutional logic allows for a certain Islamic educational policy to be formulated at a certain point in time and what factors determine the implementation success or failure of the said policy. For instance, one major focus of this book is how and why the state institutions in Indonesia and Malaysia formulated specific Islamic educational policies in response to the Islamic resurgence from the late 1970s and how the particular characters of these state institutions affected the viability of the formulated policies. As state bodies tasked with ideological inculcation, institutions overseeing Islamic education also become an arena of contestation between competing interests within and without the state, looking to shape the identity and raison d'être of the institutions. The complexity of these institutions, their inter- and intra-relationships, along the vertical (centre-periphery) and horizontal (inter-ministerial) axes of governance, determine the types of policies being formulated and how these policies are implemented and enforced.

To illustrate in the context of this book the concepts discussed previously such as critical juncture, path dependency and institutional complexity, let us turn to one of the institutions that is the focus of this study: the Malaysian Ministry of Education. Islamic revivalism in the late 1970s can be seen as the impetus for the institutional "critical juncture" that forced the Ministry of Education to adapt to the rising religious conservatism in the society and transformed the hitherto irreligious institution by infusing it with more religious values and norms, which it then

105 Ibid., pp. 138–140.

propagated across society through its curriculum, textbooks, teachers' training programs, collaboration with local Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and so on. Some of the graduates of the orthodox-influenced Islamic education system ended up working within the Ministry, thus continuing the cycle. This unbroken cycle of inculcation, dissemination and reinforcement of state Islamic orthodoxy forms a "positive feedback" mechanism within the Ministry of Education and the Malaysian Islamic Development Agency (*Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia*, JAKIM), which explains these two bodies' intra- and inter-institutional norms and cultural orientation and their engagement with the socio-political trends in the outside world (in this case, Islamic revivalism), and how they manage to remain relevant to this day. In other words, both the state institutions – Ministry of Education and JAKIM – and the deeply conservative Malay-Muslim society feed off each other with the state trying to shape the religious discourse in its favour.

Similarly, in the Indonesian case, there are historical forces and feedback mechanisms that explain the particular characteristics of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) and why they tend to be less intrusive in managing the Islamic education system than their Malaysian counterparts, despite the pervasive influence of Islamic revivalism and the highly centralized nature of the Indonesian unitary state during the New Order period. Heterogeneity in Islamic practices is very prevalent in Indonesia with major Islamic groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and Persis commanding strong grassroots support that allows these groups to remain autonomous throughout their history. As such, the ideologically moderate nature of MORA is a reflection of the diversity in the ways Islam has always been interpreted and practised in Indonesia, where no group has so far managed to monopolize the religious interpretive authority and impose its own values on others despite the best attempts by the hard-line MUI to do so. For example, the curriculum for Islamic education (*Pendidikan Agama Islam*) is a culmination of MORA's moderate institutional ideology, which can differ wildly from the views espoused by MUI, as explained above. Another reason is that the same critical juncture of Islamic resurgence that hit Malaysia in the late 1970s did not take place in the same way in Indonesia. Suharto's New Order regime was firmly ensconced in its rule, with political expression of Islam safely emasculated, which precluded any significant Islamically inspired challenge to the regime's legitimacy. The regime, in turn, did not feel the need to co-opt religious discourse in order to remain legitimate and so there was no move toward instilling pro-regime orthodox values in the Islamic education curriculum, in contrast to the Ministry of Education in Malaysia. Nonetheless, similar to the Malaysian case, some of the graduates of the Indonesian pluralist-infused Islamic education curriculum, particularly from the ideologically moderate State Islamic Universities (*Universitas Islam Negeri*, UIN) and State Islamic Institutes (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, IAIN), ended up joining MORA and going on to perpetuate the pre-existing institutional culture and ideology; in other words, acting as "positive feedback" mechanism by reinforcing the institutional status quo. Reinforcement of institutional norms through feedback mechanisms as found in

both the Malaysian and Indonesian cases makes the state institutions that deal with Islamic education resistant to change over time.

Institutional complexity, which plays an integral part in opening up windows of opportunity for agents of change to influence institutional dynamics, can be analysed through the interactions and history of relationships between all the institutional actors with interests in Islamic education. In the Indonesian case, the long-standing uneasy relationship between MORA, MOEC and their local offices, and the quasi non-governmental status of Indonesian Islamic Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI), the standard bearer of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, contribute to why policies on Islamic education are more fragmented and why the state's control over Islamic education in the country is relatively weak.[106] Meanwhile, in Malaysia, the near-uniform institutional objectives of all the agencies in charge of Islamic education such as the Ministry of Education, its local offices, JAKIM, and State Islamic Agency (*Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri*, JAIN), allow the formulation of more coherent Islamic educational policies and their effective implementation and enforcement at the local level. This book argues that the institutional complexity is higher in Indonesia than Malaysia, which then produces more opportunities for institutional agents to either preserve the status quo or effect incremental changes over time. The near ideologically monolithic state institutions in Malaysia result in less opportunity for institutional changes to take place, which produces the preservation of the status quo. Institutional complexity in the Indonesian case, on the other hand, allows for more opportunities for change to emerge. In short, different levels of institutional complexity can help to explain why Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia has taken such divergent trajectories.

Theoretical framework in the context of state functionalization of Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia

As mentioned in the opening section of this chapter, one of the questions this book asks is why has the state in Malaysia been more successful in minimizing the influence of Islamic socio-political groups compared to the state in Indonesia, and has thus been able to centralize its control over the Islamic education in the country. There are three factors that shape the state's ability to deal with the pressures from Islamic groups, and thus determine its capacity to exert more dominance, in this case, in the field of Islamic education: the ideological makeup of the state institutions; the patterns of Islamization in the society that necessitate different reactions from the state; and the control of resources by the central government that influences the interaction between the centre and periphery. The book explains these factors within the theoretical framework laid out in the

106 Two major issues that animate the uneasy relationship between these institutions especially in the era of decentralization (post-1999), which will be discussed at length in Chapter 2: the single-roof education system (sistem pendidikan satu atap) and funding for madrasah.

preceding sections, namely by employing Joel Migdal's state-in-society approach and comparative historical institutionalism. Three paired case studies in each country – Aceh, Nusa Tenggara Timur and West Java in Indonesia and Kelantan, Sarawak and Selangor in Malaysia – are used to illustrate in empirical terms the points argued by the book.

The paired comparisons are chosen for specific reasons. Aceh in Indonesia and Kelantan in Malaysia have generally similar socio-cultural backgrounds. Both are Muslim-majority areas that take pride in their long-standing Islamic learning traditions and piety, so much so that they both earn the moniker *Serambi Mekah* (Verandah of Mecca). Nusa Tenggara Timur in Indonesia and Sarawak in Malaysia are Christian-majority areas in Muslim-majority countries. They are chosen to explore dynamics of Islamic education within the Muslim-minority communities in these areas, areas that might be expected to be backwaters for Islamic education. Last, West Java in Indonesia and Selangor in Malaysia are chosen for comparison due to the popularity of integrated Islamic schools in some Muslim-majority suburbs in these two areas. Integrated Islamic schools are largely located in the middle- and upper-middle-class Muslim neighbourhoods that tend to be religiously conservative. These schools represent the aspirations of well-to-do Muslims to provide the best religious and general educations for their children. They are chosen as case studies because they represent the educational cutting edge of the Islamic resurgence.

Joel Migdal proposes that the state and society are mutually constitutive and that the various components of the state might not always work in harmony with each other due to their susceptibility to exogenous social pressures. As already noted, Migdal identifies four areas of contestation within the state, which he calls "points of pressure". In the context of this study, these refer to points in the hierarchical institutional structure that manages Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia: the executive and ministerial level (commanding heights); the policymaking bureaucracy inside the overseeing ministries (central offices); local educational offices (dispersed field offices); and the schools (trenches). The capacity of the state to implement and enforce its Islamic educational policies depends on how these pressure points interact with each other. The thrust of the argument, which strives to refine Migdal's conception of state–society relations, is the ability of the state to minimize the discrepancy and conflict in and between these pressure points so that it is able to project its hegemony more coherently. One way for the state to ensure that the pressure points are working harmoniously is by cultivating a uniform institutional culture and identity across the axes of governance.

It is therefore imperative to study the factors that shape institutional culture and identity at the aforementioned points of pressure. The book argues that the formation of an institutional identity starts with a critical juncture, an exogenously induced rupture marked by a momentous time in history. In the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, the first critical juncture was in the late 1800s and early 1900s, in which we can trace the identity formation of the institutions that oversee Islamic education to the colonial period when the Dutch and British first introduced mass education.

The interplay between colonial educational policies and their specific policies on Islam and the Muslim population was a major factor in shaping the nature of Islamic education for years to come. In particular, the dynamics between these two major factors – colonial educational and Islamic policies – are integral to explaining why and how state institutions overseeing Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia assumed certain types of characteristics at the time of their establishment.

The book argues that educational institutional identity was more decentralized and fragmented in Indonesia than in Malaysia as a result of the effects of colonial policy. While both the Dutch and the British adopted a laissez faire approach when it came to their colonial educational policies, the British exerted more oversight over the national education system by providing conditional financial assistance such as grants-in-aid and introducing Islamic instruction in Malay vernacular schools as a way to revive lagging enrolment from Malay-Muslim students. The increased bureaucratization of Islam in British Malaya that started in the early 1900s, which placed many private Islamic schools under the control of State Religious Councils (*Majlis Agama Islam Negeri*) and later the Ministry of Education, also explains why state educational institutions in Malaysia assumed a more centralized form than their equivalents in Indonesia. These particular institutional characteristics – the degree of centralization and bureaucratization of Islam – formed a set of constraints that shaped the future trajectory and propensity for change of the institutions. Between the 1950s and 1970s, the ministry in Malaysia did not actively try to centralize its control over Islamic education, lacking political motive and facing constitutional constraints that reserved the management of Islamic schools for state bureaucracies. It was only in the late 1970s when the ministry started to exert more influence over Islamic schools.

When the second critical juncture appeared in the late 1970s in the form of the Islamic resurgence, it brought about different opportunities for institutional change within the ministries in Indonesia and Malaysia. The Malay-dominated civil service and the ascendancy of pro-Malay policies, a result of the 1971 New Economic Policy (NEP), provided prime opportunities for newly empowered Malay-Muslim activists to Islamize the state institutions and to use the deep reach of the state to inculcate the Malay-Muslim society in their own values, giving rise to the state Islamic orthodoxy as discussed in the previous section (and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). The same critical juncture did not have a similar effect on state institutions in Indonesia. The New Order regime did not deem it necessary to engage in Islamic discourse for political legitimacy, and thus provided no opportunities for change agents to transform the institutional culture within the state. This essentially meant the preservation of the pre-existing decentralized and fragmented status quo.

Finally, ideological hegemony and state Islamic orthodoxy are two important interrelated concepts that inform the ability of the state to functionalize Islamic education for its own political ends. In the Indonesian case, this book argues that the political end for the state in functionalizing Islamic education is to promote unity based on diversity of religious and cultural practices especially in the Reformasi era (1998 to present). The values that make up the state Islamic orthodoxy in

Indonesia are moderate and inclusive in nature, which is a reflection of the influence that various Islamic social groups of many ideological stripes exercise in shaping the overarching ideological orientation of the state institutions in Indonesia. The lack of institutional cohesion in Indonesia, marked by the dearth of common goals among various state institutions, results in a porous Indonesian state that can be influenced with relative ease by Islamic social groups with varying ideologies. This lack of common institutional goal, when compared to the more institutionally cohesive Malaysia, is because the state in Indonesia does not depend on dominating the Islamic discourse for its legitimacy, unlike its Malaysian counterpart, which has the explicit institutional agenda to Islamize the bureaucracy and the society. The ideological coherency of state institutions in Malaysia and their shared institutional goals of propagating a single unchallenged interpretation of Islam, run almost seamlessly from the centre to the periphery of governance. The high degree of ideological congruency between various state institutions and the Malay-Muslim society allows the state in Malaysia to exert its ideological hegemony in the form of state Islamic orthodoxy more effectively with minimal interference from countervailing Islamic social groups.[107] In Indonesia, in contrast, the incoherent overarching institutional goals of the Indonesian state lead to more divided and permeable state institutions prone to influence from social groups, which, in turn, weakens the state's ability to exert its hegemony in the field of Islamic education. The 1999 decentralization laws further exacerbate the Indonesian state's weak control over Islamic education when the matters of education are transferred to the local levels while religious affairs remain at the centre (more discussion on this subject in Chapter 2). In sum, the variegated Islamic practices in Indonesian society shape the values that make up the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia but at the same time contribute to the inability of the state to exert more dominance due to the ideological incoherency among the state institutions, in this case, the ones that deal with Islamic education.

Organization of the book

The book is organized into six chapters, three of which consist of paired comparisons of similar Islamic educational settings in Indonesia and Malaysia. Chapter 1 outlines the research questions, argument, and hypothesis. It also

107 In 2008 the Malaysian government via the Prime Minister's Office, of which JAKIM is also part, established Islamic Consultative Council (Majlis Perundingan Islam, MPI), which currently consists of 87 members from various backgrounds such as civil servants, academics, ulama, CEOs, and heads of major Islamic NGOs. MPI's main function is to act as a "think tank" that helps the government to implement development policies based on Islamic principles. Mesyuarat Majlis Perundingan Islam: www.islam.gov.my/en/mesyuarat-majlis-perundingan-islam (accessed on 15 February 2016). For a list of MPI members, see http://e-muamalat.gov.my/sites/default/files/VVIP/a8-_majlis_perundingan_islam.pdf (accessed on 15 February 2016). See also "Deputy minister admits Putrajaya funds Islamic groups, including Isma", Malay Mail Online, 13 February 2016 (accessed on 13 February 2016).

frames the book in a larger theoretical and comparative picture by drawing from literature on sociology of education, modern Islamic education in the Muslim world, state–society relations, institutionalism, and orthodoxy.

Chapter 2 delves deeper into state functionalization of Islamic education and national education in general in Indonesia and Malaysia by tracing the trajectory of the state institutions overseeing mass education and the variation of policies from the colonial period until the present day. The chapter starts with a discussion of educational policies during the late colonial period (late 1800s to 1950s) when the Dutch and the British tried to introduce and implement standardized mass education in the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya, respectively. In the post-colonial era, mass education became inextricably enmeshed with the nationalism project as the states in Indonesia and Malaysia tried to formulate new national identities and inculcate their standardized values through the national education system. The national education system was transformed into a political battleground as various groups contended for their ideological views to be heard, which, in turn, affected the nature of the state institutions dealing with national education, and Islamic education in particular. The chapter ends with an overview of the organizational structure and functions of the state institutions and types of Islamic schools that comprise the Islamic education system in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Chapter 3 uses case studies from Aceh in Indonesia and Kelantan in Malaysia since these two areas are socio-culturally very similar, particularly when it comes to their deeply conservative Islamic cultures. The chapter strives to illustrate in detail why, despite the two areas' shared legacy of Islamic learning, Aceh has been able to preserve the uniqueness of its Islamic educational tradition while Islamic education in Kelantan is slowly being "federalized" by the government in Putrajaya. The modern Islamic education system in Aceh and Kelantan traces its formation to the late colonial period and early years of independence when various socio-political groups jockeyed to become the sole representative of Islamic authority in both areas. These local power dynamics coincided with efforts by the centralizing states in Indonesia (up until 1998) and Malaysia to impose their own ideals through the national education system. Islamic education became a contested arena between advocates for the preservation of local Islamic learning traditions and agents of state educational institutions who saw local traditions as both a threat to the state's legitimacy and an opportunity to be exploited in order to buttress the state's legitimacy. In the end, it is argued that, despite the present progress of Islamic education in both areas, Aceh has been more successful in preserving the uniqueness of its learning tradition than Kelantan, where the federal government over the past four decades has been slowly ensuring that learning conforms to national standards.

Chapter 4 presents case studies from Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) in Indonesia and Sarawak in Malaysia. The reason for the comparison is because both areas have Christian-majority population and lack long-standing traditions of Islamic learning, and therefore it is interesting to explore the dynamics of Islamic education in these two Muslim backwater areas. The book argues the differences in political strength of the respective Muslim-minority groups mean that Islamic

education in Sarawak is much better off than in NTT. At the heart of the chapter's argument is a matrix of power relations and tolerance, in which concessions made by the minority group are measured against the political dominance of the majority group. In NTT, the Muslim-minority group is politically weak, so much so that the Christian-majority group is able to extract many concessions from the Muslim-minority group without threatening its own social and political dominance. In Sarawak, on the other hand, the Muslim-minority group is politically dominant. It does not have to concede much when it comes to political power and control of resources due to the heavy backing from the Malay-Muslim dominated federal government in Putrajaya, while at the same time keeping check on the social and political domination of the non-Muslim majority group. The chapter lists three factors that explain the discrepancy of political strength of Muslim-minority groups in these two areas: historical legacy, post-independence political dynamics, and centre-periphery relations. In NTT, the weak reach of the central state from Jakarta, coupled with the pluralist values inherent in the state Islamic orthodoxy, allows local Islamic schools and education offices to adapt Islamic education to the multi-religious context of the region. In short, despite the lack of local autonomy, Islamic education in Sarawak seems to be better off than in NTT.

Chapter 5 focuses on the rising popularity of integrated Islamic schools among urban middle- and upper-middle-class Muslims in Depok, Indonesia and Bangi, Malaysia, Muslim-dominated suburban enclaves in the outskirts of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, respectively. The chapter argues that due to their genesis in the Islamic socio-political movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, integrated Islamic schools serve as an ideological training ground for future cadres for the Islamic political movement. Presently, integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia are generally affiliated with the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) and other ideologically like-minded modernist Islamic organizations while their counterparts in Malaysia typically sympathize with the opposition despite their Islamically conservative ideological orientation. In the context of the broader argument, this chapter shows how financial autonomy and state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia and Malaysia allow for the aforementioned dynamics to take place. Not being financially dependent on the state provides integrated Islamic schools in both countries the discursive space to promote their conservative brand of Islam and political indoctrination since financial autonomy equals less supervision and onerous bureaucratic demands from the state. State Islamic orthodoxy in each respective country also plays an important role in the said discursive space. Pluralist values of the Indonesian Islamic state orthodoxy mean that some schools can even promote a deeply conservative version of Islam that might run counter to state's more tolerant and inclusive interpretation of Islam. In Malaysia, the state Islamic orthodoxy provides conservative integrated Islamic schools room for political dissent against the government as long as the opposition takes place within the discursive space delimited by the state's conservative Islamic values.

Chapter 6 concludes the book by summarizing the argument and points made in the previous chapters and offering possible avenues for future research into the topic.

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